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BACK TO THE 1930s?
THE SHAKY CASE FOR
EXEMPTING DIVIDENDS
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
In recent weeks, there has been a renewed push for
an old idea from the first Bush administration: Enact
an exemption for dividends. The details are unclear,
except for the potential significant revenue loss (some
$485 billion over 10 years).1 The rationale for exempt-
ing dividends now is to boost the economy or at least
revive the sagging stock market. Neither of these
reasons is persuasive as an argument for a major
change of our corporate tax structure. In general, as
recent studies of last year’s tax rebate have shown, it
is very hard to boost the economy with tax cuts.2 In
addition, most taxable dividends are paid to high-
income individuals who are likely to save, not
spend the added funds.3
As for the stock market, it is unclear that increasing
the price of stocks is a legitimate ground for govern-
ment intervention (Alan Greenspan, for one, does not
seem to think so). But even if it were, economists dis-
agree about whether the tax on dividends has any im-
pact on the price of shares. A high percentage of cor-
porate equity is held through pension plans and by
other tax-exempt institutions that do not pay the tax
on dividends. Many corporations, like Microsoft or
Intel, do not pay dividends. Thus, it is doubtful that
cutting the tax on dividends will have a significant
impact on the stock market. And even if it did, current
holders of the stock, wealthy individuals who bought
the stock at a discounted price anticipating that they
would be taxed on future dividends, would get an
unjustified windfall.
However, there is a more serious case for exempting
dividends, which is that exemption is a form of corporate/
shareholder integration, similar to what the U.S. had
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tion may be more than offset by efficiency losses
when the international aspects of the proposal are
considered.
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1The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 2002, p. A1.
2See Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, “Consumer
Response to Tax Rebates,” NBER Working Paper 8672 (Dec.
2001); Matthew D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, “Did the 2001
Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? Evidence From Taxpayer
Surveys,” NBER Working Paper 9308 (Nov. 2002).
3It is interesting that one of the reasons given for cutting
back on intergration in Europe (see Appendix) is to dis-
courage corporations from distributing earnings and en-
couraging them to invest instead. Since one of the problems
with the current U.S. economy is underinvestment by corpo-
rations, this argument has some relevance here.
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up to 1936.4 A significant body of academic literature
supports integration, and the Treasury proposed the
dividend exemption form of integration in 1992.5 In
addition, most of our major trading partners (it is said)
have some form of integration.6
The rationale for exempting dividends
now is to boost the economy or at
least revive the sagging stock market.
Neither of these reasons is persuasive
as an argument for a major change of
our corporate tax structure.
Or do they? The recent trend, in fact, has been to
move away from integration. Integration has been cut
back severely in Japan, Germany, and the U.K., and is
being reconsidered in Italy and France.7 Other
countries (for example, Singapore) have also recently
restricted the scope of integration. Thus, it may still be
true that most of our trading partners practice integra-
tion (as they have since the 1970s), but perhaps not for
long.
What is the reason for this reversal? In a word, it is
globalization — or more specifically here, the increas-
ing levels of cross-border equity investments. Integra-
tion has generally not been applied to foreign share-
holders (except sometimes in treaties, and except for a
brief failed attempt by the Australians in the 1990s).8
As more and more investors are foreign, integration
looks much less appealing to each country. In Europe,
there is the added complication that the European
Court of Justice is forcing countries to grant integration
to investors from other European countries if they
grant it to domestic shareholders, which is the major
reason for the German and U.K. moves to change from
full imputation to partial dividend exemption (rather
than extend it to foreign investors).9
Thus, this seems to be a good time to re-examine the
case for corporate tax integration (via dividend exemp-
tion or other means). On a closer look, it turns out that
in a globalizing world, this case is much shakier than
is commonly thought. In what follows, I will first ex-
plain the traditional case for integration and its limita-
tions. I will then examine the drawbacks of integration
from an international perspective. Finally, I will make
some alternative suggestions about what should be
done if we do or do not adopt integration.
I. The Traditional Case for Integration
Historically, there have been three reasons advanced
for countries to adopt corporate/shareholder integra-
tion, to overcome biases in the classical system:10
1. Under the classical system, there is a bias to con-
duct business in noncorporate forms, since they
are not subject to double taxation (although this
is mitigated if the individual rate exceeds the
corporate rate, since in corporate form the in-
dividual tax can be deferred).
2. Under the classical system, there is a bias to
avoid dividend distributions and instead retain
earnings, thus avoiding the double tax (this bias
is exacerbated when the individual rate exceeds
the corporate rate);
3. Under the classical system, there is a bias in favor
of capitalizing corporations with debt (produc-
ing deductible interest) rather than equity
(producing nondeductible dividends).
None of these reasons is completely convincing in the
U.S. context, which may be a reason why the U.S. has
maintained the classical system since 1936 (and indeed
strengthened it in 1986 with the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine, which enabled corporations to
avoid corporate tax on a distribution of appreciated
assets). First, the alleged bias against the corporate
form is mitigated by the excess of the individual rate
4For an excellent historical review of how dividend exemp-
tion was adopted and then abolished see Steven A. Bank,
“Corporate Managers, Agency Costs and the Rise of Double
Taxation,” 44 William & Mary L. Rev. 167 (2002). For the reason
we have not reinstated the exemption, see Jennifer Arlen and
Deborah M. Weiss, “A Political Theory of Corporate Taxa-
tion,” 105 Yale L. J. 325 (1995). In both cases, the blame is put
on corporate managers who do not want pressure to pay
dividends.
5See generally Michael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren Jr.,
Integration of the U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes:
The Treasury Department and American Law Institute Reports
(Tax Analysts, 1998); Charles E. McLure Jr., Must Corporate
Income Be Taxed Twice (Brookings Institution, 1979); “Collo-
quium on Corporate Integration,” 47 Tax L. Rev. 427 (1992).
For a rare dissent, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, “The Uncertain Case
Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income,” 68 N.C.
L. Rev. 613 (1990).
6For a review of the principal systems, see Hugh J. Ault,
Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Kluwer,
1997), 285-289; Peter A. Harris, Corporate/Shareholder Income
Taxation (IBFD, 1996).
7For Germany, the U.K., and France, see Appendix; for
Italy, see Anneliese Egger and Stefano Pellegrini, “Ambitious
Reform Bill to Restructure Italy’s Corporate Tax Regime,” Tax
Notes Int’l,  Oct.  28, 2002, p. 316. In general, of OECD
countries, Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, New Zealand,
and Norway currently have full integration; France, Ger-
many, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the U.K. have partial
integration; Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and the U.S. have a classical system. See Howell
Zee, “Taxing Capital in a Globalized World,” Tax Notes Int’l,
June 28, 2002, p. 1185; Rainer Niemann, Mark Bachmann, and
Deborah Knirsch, “Lessons From the Ruding II Report,” Tax
Notes Int’l, June 25, 2002, p. 1545. This is nowhere near the
unanimity of the adoption of VAT, for example (which has
now been adopted by all OECD members except the U.S.).
8See Hugh J. Ault, “Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and
the Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Prac-
tices,” 47 Tax L. Rev. 565 (1992); Harris, note 6 supra. The
international tax regime allocates the right to tax active in-
come to the source country and passive income (including
dividends) to the residence country — hence, no integration
unless one or the other gives up its right to tax (e.g., by
exempting dividends paid by foreign corporations). See
generally, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Structure of Interna-
tional Taxation,” 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996).
9For the details, see Appendix.
10See Graetz and Warren, note 5 supra.
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over the corporate rate (although that excess is much
lower now than it was before 1986, and is scheduled
to disappear) and by the absence of strong provisions
to prevent retentions in the domestic context.11 In ad-
dition, under current rules, the classical system applies
primarily to large, publicly traded corporations, while
small, closely held businesses are able to avoid the
double tax even if they are in corporate form for nontax
purposes. It is doubtful if there is sufficient sub-
stitutability between the two forms of business for the
double tax to create much deadweight loss from the
bias toward noncorporate form.12 The double tax is a
price large businesses have to pay for access to the
public equity markets and the liquidity that accom-
panies that access. Finally, to the extent that the corpo-
rate tax can be shifted to consumers or to labor, the bias
disappears, and even the Treasury’s 1991 integration
study has suggested that considerable shifting can take
place.13 (The bias reappears again if noncorporate busi-
nesses can likewise shift the individual tax burden, but
it seems plausible that the shifting potential of large
multinationals is larger than that of small, closely held
businesses.)
Second, the bias in favor of retentions is mitigated
by the ability of corporations to redeem shares from
shareholders at the favorable capital gains rate, and by
the fact that numerous shareholders are tax exempt or
corporate (and thus do not pay a full tax on divi-
dends).14 Indeed, even U.S. corporations that used to
pay dividends have now generally moved to struc-
tured redemption programs addressed to their taxable
individual shareholders.15 Other corporations (espe-
cially high-tech ones) retain all their earnings, but it is
not clear that this is primarily tax motivated (corpora-
tions used to pay dividends under the same rules in
the past). Finally, there is an unresolved debate among
economists whether the dividend tax is capitalized into
the price of the shares. If it is, then the retention bias
applies only to new equity, but new equity is unlikely
to pay dividends for nontax reasons.16
Third, the bias in favor of debt and against equity
is a general problem of the income tax that should not
be addressed only in the corporate tax area.17 More-
over, to address it completely it is necessary to make
dividends not exempt, but rather deductible, a form of
integration that is never adopted (in part because it
would automatically extend integration to foreign and
tax-exempt shareholders). If integration takes the nor-
mal forms of imputation or dividend exemption, there
is still a difference in treatment between interest and
dividends that can be manipulated.18
II. The International Case Against Integration
Even if one accepts the validity of all the alleged
biases generated by the classical system set out above,
all of them need to be offset by the countervailing
biases created by integration in the international con-
text.19 Two situations need to be considered: when the
source country is integrationist and the residence
country classical, and when the source country is clas-
sical and the residence country integrationist. In the
following, I assume the current U.S. (classical) regime;
if dividend exemption were adopted here, one would
need to switch the examples to treat the U.S. as the
integrationist country.
A. U.S. as Residence Country
If a U.S.-resident portfolio investor invests in shares
of a company of an integrationist country, the resulting
bias depends on the form taken by integration. If the
source country grants integration in the form of divi-
dend exemption, the U.S. investor would not benefit
since the U.S. would tax him on the dividend without
allowing a foreign tax credit for underlying corporate
taxes. A domestic investor in the source country would
be subject only to the corporate tax, while the U.S.
11The accumulated earnings tax and the personal holding
company tax are both weak.
12Most estimates of the deadweight loss (DWL) from this
bias are quite low — see, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, “The Impact
and Inefficiency of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence From
State Organizational Form Data,” NBER Working Paper 9141
(September 2002) (an increase in the corporate tax rate by 10
percent reduces the corporate share of firms by 5-10 percent
and the corporate share of sales and employment by 2-6
percent). Goolsbee concludes that “[t]he impact of tax rates
is an order of magnitude larger than previous estimates . . .
and suggests a larger DWL from corporate taxation, but is
still relatively modest.” As Goolsbee says, previous studies
found much lower DWLs.
13Graetz and Warren, note 5 supra.
14In addition, this bias is reduced when (as now) the cor-
porate rate is not significantly lower than the individual rate.
15Of course, this can be used as evidence that the lack of
integration leads to a distorted choice of the form of distribu-
tion. Query, however, whether anybody but the IRS cares
about the dividend/redemption distinction. In addition, U.S.
corporations used to pay more dividends under the classical
regime, and some are reverting to it now because of the
signaling effect (showing that profits are for real). Thus, the
choice between dividends and redemptions seems to be
driven by nontax factors at least as much as by the tax factor.
It would be interesting to compare current U.S. practice to
other countries that have integration.
16The burden would still fall on the shareholders when they
sell their shares, but this is mitigated by deferral until sale
and by the capital gains preference.
17See Alvin C. Warren Jr., “Financial Contract Innovation
and Income Tax Policy,” 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460 (1993).
18For example, if interest is taxed but dividends are not,
you can have clientele effects (tax-exempts will hold bonds
and taxable shareholders stock), as well as invest in stock
and use derivatives to turn this economically into an invest-
ment in bonds (see Warren, note 17 supra). Neither of these
problems arise if both interest and dividends are deductible
or (as under the Treasury’s CBIT model, see Graetz and War-
ren, note 5 supra) nondeductible, but neither of these seems
to be a practical option politically.
19Admittedly, any welfare gain from adopting integration
is likely to be experienced mostly by U.S. residents, while the
welfare losses arising from integration internationally are
likely in the short run to be experienced by foreigners. But
from a worldwide efficiency perspective, the two should be
netted against each other. In addition, in the long run, world-
wide welfare losses are likely to affect the U.S. as well.
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investor would be subject to the corporate tax, any U.S.
withholding tax on dividends, and the residual U.S.
tax.
If the source country grants integration by way of
imputation credits, the key issue is whether those
credits are extended to foreign investors (by treaty or
otherwise). If (as is typical) the credits are not extended
to foreigners, a domestic investor would be subject to
tax only at his or her individual rate, while the U.S.
investor would be subject to tax at the corporate level,
any withholding tax on dividends, and the residual
U.S. tax. Whether the combination of these taxes ex-
ceeds the source-country tax on domestic investors
depends on how high the source-country rates are (it
is conceivable, for example, that a combined tax on the
U.S. investor of 60 percent would be matched by the
single-level source-country tax on a domestic investor).
Even if one accepts the validity of all
the alleged biases generated by the
classical system set out in this report,
all of them need to be offset by the
countervailing biases created by
integration in the international context.
If the imputation credits are extended to U.S. inves-
tors, a different bias arises. In that case, both domestic
source country and U.S. investors in a foreign corpo-
ration would be taxed the same by the source country,
but the cost of imputation credits to U.S. investors
would be borne by the source country, while any tax
on the dividend would be collected by the U.S. From
a U.S. perspective, moreover, there would be a bias in
favor of investing in source-country corporations and
against investing in U.S. corporations, since only div-
idends from the former would carry the imputation
credits. Such a bias would not be eliminated by the U.S.
taxing the dividends in full, since the investor would
still receive an imputation credit check from the source
country not available for her U.S. investment.
B. U.S. as Source Country
If the foreign residence country grants integration
by way of dividend exemption, presumably the exemp-
tion would apply to dividends from U.S. as well as
from domestic corporations.20 In that case, a bias is
created in favor of foreign investors in U.S. companies,
since they would be exempt from tax on the dividend
(unless a U.S. withholding tax applies, but those taxes
are generally reduced by treaty or avoided by other
devices). By contrast, a U.S. domestic investor would
be taxable on the dividends in full.
If the foreign country grants integration by way of
imputation credits, there will be no credits available
for a foreign investor who invests directly in a U.S.
company. In that case, there will be a bias in favor of
the foreigner investing in her own country’s domestic
corporations. This bias may be partially eliminated if
credit is given for U.S. taxes to a domestic portfolio
investor in a domestic company with U.S.-source in-
come. But, similar to the case of a dividend exemption,
that would create a bias in favor of foreign investors
in such companies over U.S. investors in a domestic
U.S. corporation.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
In general, there seems to be no reason to assume that
the biases created by integration from an international per-
spective are less important than the biases created by the
classical system from a domestic perspective. In fact, the
former may be gaining in importance as cross-border
investment grows, while (as discussed above) there are
reasons to doubt the importance of the latter. This is
the reason why many countries (for example, Japan,
Germany, and the U.K.) have recently been restricting
integration. If the whole world reverted to the classical
system, the international biases would be eliminated.21
Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, some
countries will continue to grant integration while
others are likely to maintain a classical system. In that
situation, it is necessary to make a choice between the
international biases described above, which is similar
to the choice between capital import neutrality (treat-
ing all investors in the source country alike) and capital
export neutrality (treating all investment opportunities
to a resident investor alike). Since most of the empirical
evidence continues to suggest that the elasticity of the
demand for capital is greater than the elasticity of the
supply of capital, most economists would support a
continued preference for capital export neutrality
(neutrality in the allocation of investments) over capi-
tal import neutrality (neutrality in the allocation of
savings).
If one prefers capital export neutrality, this suggests
that integrationist source countries should not extend
integration benefits to foreign investors (since that
would violate CEN while maintaining CIN). This is
consistent with current  practice. When the in-
tegrationist country is the residence country, integra-
tion benefits should be extended to investments in clas-
sical source countries. This can be done by granting
integration credits for taxes paid to the source country,
either through a domestic corporation (which is com-
mon) or even through a foreign corporation (less com-
mon but possible — it is equivalent to granting the
indirect foreign tax credit to portfolio U.S. investors,
which would raise many difficult administrative is-
sues). A simpler solution, however, is to exempt divi-
dends from both domestic and foreign corporations.
20This is true for many dividend-exemption countries but
not for others.
21The biases may also be eliminated if all countries adopted
integration in similar ways. However, under current imputa-
tion systems, domestic investment in local companies is
generally favored and inbound and outbound investment dis-
couraged (although ordering rules for distributions may
mitigate this bias). This situation may persist even if all
countries adopted integration. In addition, the current trend
seems to be toward abandoning integration rather than adopt-
ing it.
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This would still leave a possible bias in the form of a
dividend withholding tax imposed by the source
country (plus a branch profits tax if the investment is
through a foreign corporation), but in the case of the
U.S., portfolio investors can usually avoid the dividend
withholding tax.
Thus, if the U.S. were to adopt integration, I would
recommend dividend exemption as the chosen method,
as long as dividends from both domestic and foreign
corporations are exempt. This would preserve CEN as
far as the U.S. is concerned, but there will still be a bias
in favor of investing in domestic corporations to the
extent foreign source countries levy a withholding tax
on dividends. In addition, foreign investors in U.S.
corporations would be disadvantaged compared to
U.S. investors, either because of U.S. withholding taxes
on dividends (which the U.S. can and should abolish)
or because their country of residence taxes dividends
(which the U.S. can do nothing about).
However, the best solution from a U.S. perspective
to the above biases is to maintain the current classical
system, as the case against it is shaky.22 A temporary
recession and stock market downturn is no reason to
abandon our long-standing method of taxing corpora-
tions and shareholders.
22In that case, we should consider abolishing the withhold-
ing tax on dividends (and the branch profits tax) so as to do
our part to reduce the bias against investors from in-
tegrationist countries.
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